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In this paper we analyse the determination of cost efficiency in a sample of Italian small banks located in different 
geographical areas and including two great institutional categories: cooperative banks (CB’s) and other banks. 
We highlight the effect of environmental factors (asset quality, local GDP per capita) on banks’ performance, and 
provide novel evidence in favour of the “bad luck” hypothesis suggested by Berger and De Young (Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 1997). Local GDP per capita strongly affects the territorial differentials for technical 
efficiency, especially for CB’s. This can be easily rationalised, as current regulations hamper CB’s vis-à-vis other 
banks in their capability to diversify territorially. Our estimates provide us with a tentative quantitative measure of 
the costs of missing diversification, ranging between 2 and 7 percentage points. Correspondingly, our evidence 
suggests that there is potentially strong endogeneity in some currently available bank performance indicators. 
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The fundamental importance of the financial sector for the economic and social development of a 
given area has long been recognised in the literature, and has recently become one of the leading 
themes of the growth literature (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Guiso et al., 2004). Within this 
literature, a theme that has been somewhat neglected concerns the efficiency of bank institutions 
(see however Hasan et al., 2009, as well as the references included there, Lucchetti et al., 2001, 
in particular). Yet, already Cameron et al. (1967) had forcefully stressed the key role of bank 
efficiency in the finance-growth nexus. This suggests that providing novel evidence about 
territorial bank efficiency differentials in a country characterised by strong economic 
heterogeneity as Italy could be of some general interest. This is precisely what we endeavour in 
this paper along the following lines. 
In the literature concerned with the determination of bank efficiency the themes of regulation and 
proprietary forms have always enjoyed a prominent status among (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; 
Berger and Mester, 1997). These themes have almost invariably been taken in account without 
explicit allowance for changes in the socio-economic environment of banks. The latter are, on 
the other hand, intimately connected with the theme of risk management within the productive 
process of banks (Hughes and Mester, 1993; Berger and De Young, 1997). In this paper we bring 
together these two strands of the banking literature, within a frontier efficiency analysis of Italian 
small banks. As a matter of fact, we focus on Italian cooperative banks (CB’s), whose regulatory 
structure is particularly suited to the analysis of the interaction between regulation and risk. 
Other Italian small banks will mainly be considered for purposes of comparison. We believe that 
our analysis may be of relevance, not only because European cooperative banks have recently 
spurred considerable policy interest (see, for instance, Fonteyne, 2007, who also highlights the  
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important role of Italian CB’s), but also because we produce some quantitative estimates of the 
impact of (territorial) risk diversification upon bank efficiency. Estimates of this kind are not yet 
widely available (see however Hughes et al., 1996, 1999; and Deng et al., 2007), and are to the 
best of our knowledge wholly missing for European banks. 
Our analysis consists of the following steps. Section 2 examines the production process of banks, 
considering some traditional ways to incorporate risk and socio-economic environment in it. In 
Section 3 we introduce the reader to some features of Italian CB’s and, more generally, of the 
Italian economy, which provide the backbone of our empirical set-up. Section 4 describes the 
latter. We argue that the regulatory structure of Italian CB’s, as well as the utilisation of relatively 
novel, territorially very disaggregated, information about economic activity, makes it possible to 
obtain some innovative evidence about the impact of risk and diversification upon bank 
efficiency. We also briefly describe our data sources and empirical methods. Our key findings are 
set out in Section 5. Some concluding remarks close the paper, taking stock of our evidence and 
proposing avenues for future research. 
 
2. The production process of banks: background and recent extensions 
As can be gathered from some classic accounts (European Union, 1977; Niehans, 1978; Fama, 
1980), banks are a typical example of multi-output activities. These activities include: (i) asset 
management, (ii) foreign currency management (iii) provision of export credit, (iv) issue of 
various securities (checks, payment cards, etc.), (v) asset safekeeping, (vi) support for various 
kinds of financial transactions (buying and selling government securities, bonds, shares, mutual 
investment funds). This multi-faceted nature finds a counterpart in the variety of approaches 
utilised to describe the production process of banks (Van Hoose, 2010).  
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In the "asset" approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1997), akin to the "intermediation" approach, the 
bank is mainly a financial intermediary, which uses deposits to fund loans and other types of 
financial assets in order to encourage customers to invest. For this reason, deposits are included 
in the vector of inputs, thus differing from the "value added", also called "production", approach 
(Goldschmidt, 1981). According to the latter, the primary task of lending institutions is to 
provide services related to both loans and deposits using labour and capital as inputs. The 
superiority of one approach over the other is still the matter of some discussion. Combining the 
"asset" and "value added" approaches, we obtain the "modified production" or "profit/revenue" 
approach (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). This approach captures the dual role of banking 
operations, considering the price of deposits to be an input, whilst the volume of deposits is an 
output. In this specification, banks are assumed provided intermediation and loan services as 
well as payment, liquidity, and safekeeping services at the same time. The three approaches are 
compared in Table 1. 
The "asset" approach has maintained some ascendancy within the literature, especially when 
focusing on the role of banking efficiency for economic development (Lucchetti et al., 2001; 
Hasan et al., 2009), and it will be the approach chosen in the following empirical analysis. At any 
rate, the awareness has grown that in order to measure accurately bank efficiency, allowance 
must be made for environmental factors beyond the control of bank managers, as well as for the 
role of risk aversion. The correct measurement of bank efficiency hence requires the analysis to 
include not only the inputs and outputs enumerated in Table 1, but also indicators of environment 
and risk-aversion. 
It is well known that efficiency measurement involving banks from different territories ought to 
make allowance for differences in the socio-economic and institutional environment beyond the  
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control of bank managers. There are various analyses of bank efficiency across US states (see 
Lozano–Vivas et al., 2002, p.2). Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000) and Lozano-Vivas et al. 
(2002) analyse the impact of other environmental factors beyond the control of bank managers, 
 
Table 1 - Value Added, Asset and Modified Production Approaches: The Production Set  
Approaches Outputs  Inputs 
 
Value Added Approach  




Securities (bank loans, Treasury bills 
and similar securities, bonds and 
other debt minus bonds and debt 
securities held by banks and other 
financial institutions) 







(Sealey and Lindley, 1997) 
 
Customer Loans 
Securities (bank loans, Treasury bills 
and similar securities, bonds and 
other debt minus bonds and debt 
securities held by banks and other 
financial institutions) 





Funds (customer deposits, bank 




Modified Production Approach 




Securities (bank loans, Treasury bills 
and similar securities, bonds and 
other debt minus bonds and debt 
securities held by banks and other 
financial institutions) 





Funds (customer deposits, bank 
debts, bonds, certificates of deposit 
and other securities) 
 
notably the degree of concentration (measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index), population 
density, GDP per capita, in a European cross-country set-up. It can be easily argued that similar 
indicators are needed in order to take into account territorial differences in the socio-economic 
environment even within a given European country, if the latter is characterised by marked 
                                                 
2   Sometimes free capital, the difference between equity and fixed assets, is also included in the input vector 
because it constitutes an additional source of resources, over and above the collection of funds (see Destefanis, 
2001)  
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heterogeneity. However, more seldom, if at all (a very recent exception is Hasan et al., 2009), 
these factors have been utilised in works dealing with within-country comparisons for European 
countries. 
A key indicator varying along with the socio-economic environment is risk. Banks can be mainly 
hit by credit risk, which relates to the management of subjective uncertainty and, in many cases, 
depends on the discretion of managers, who may not behave in the bank's interest. According to 
Berger and De Young (1997), the existence of risky assets entails additional "monitoring" and 
"screening" costs that banks must meet in order to assess them. Hence, changes in economic 
environment may bring about deteriorations in the banks’ performances (the “bad luck” 
hypothesis), but also poor risk management may bring about a higher insolvency risk (the “bad 
management” hypothesis). 
A popular indicator of credit risk is the ratio between bad and total loans. This indicator is related 
to the probability of bank failure. If banks do not bear any credit risk it is close to zero, and it 
approaches unity if financial intermediaries incur in a higher percentage of outstanding claims. 
Clearly, however, this indicator is linked to both the “bad luck” and “bad management” 
mechanisms. Indeed, Berger and De Young (1997) resort to a time-series analyses in order to 
disentangle the two different links between it and banks’ efficiency. A related point, made by 
Berger and De Young themselves, is that it could be interesting to analyse the “bad luck” 
hypothesis relying on indicators of credit risk that are exogenous for a given bank. To the best of 
our knowledge, this attempt has never been carried out in the literature. 
In any case, if bank managers are not risk-neutral, their degree of risk-aversion is likely to be 
reflected in their choices about the production set. The bank's behavioural response to risk is 
measured by an index of capitalisation, very often the relationship between equity and total  
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assets (Hughes and Mester, 1993; Mester, 1996). This index approximates to one if banks are 
highly capitalized. In this case, the banks can cope with possible risks without incurring danger 
of default. A similar situation arises when banks are subject to more intense merger and 
acquisition processes. 
Another fundamental point concerning risk management is risk diversification. Broadly 
speaking, diversification can occur across income sources, industries or geographical areas 
(Rossi et al., 2009). Focusing on territorial diversification, Hughes et al. (1996, 1999) find that 
territorial diversification is positively correlated with bank efficiency in the US. In particular, 
interstate bank diversification has improved bank efficiency in the US after the passage of the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Banking Efficiency Act in 1994. Also for the US, Deng et al. 
(2007), measuring territorial diversification through various indexes of deposit dispersion, find 
that diversification has a favourable impact upon the risk-return profile of bank holding 
companies.
3 Again, there seems to be room in literature for further evidence on this point, 
especially if coming from small European banks. 
Summing up, we believe this short survey highlights the need for novel European-based 
evidence on the impact of territorial diversification on bank efficiency and risk-return profile. 
This evidence should rely on disaggregated indicators of socio-economic environment, likely to 
capture hitherto neglected heterogeneity and to allow a sharper test of the “bad luck” hypothesis 
(being exogenous for a given bank). This is our endeavour in the present study. We analyse 
efficiency for a sample of small Italian banks, modelling differences in risk-preferences through 
an index of capitalisation and allowing for differences in the socio-economic environment 
                                                 
3   These findings are related to the huge block of literature relating to the impact of M&A on bank efficiency, a 
point also made in Bos and Kolari (2005), who, considering the potential gains from geographic expansion for 
large European and US banks, concluded that profit efficiency gains were obtainable from cross-Atlantic bank 
mergers.  
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through GDP per capita indicators computed at a finer level of territorial disaggregation than 
hitherto utilised in the literature (this level approximately entails a population close to a local 
bank customers’ pool). In order to shed light on the impact of territorial diversification on bank 
efficiency and risk-return profile, we chiefly compare the performance of cooperative and 
traditional small banks across Italian regions. As will be presently clarified, we exploit here the 
fact that CB’s follow different rules from other banks as far as diversification is concerned. 
 
3. Italian cooperative banks: main features and environment 
In Italy there are nowadays approximately 430 CB's with more than 3600's branches (about 11% 
of the total of all branches) and shares of 6.6 and 8.3% over, respectively, total loans and 
deposits. Italian CB’s have an important role in the financing of households, artisans and small 
businesses, and are characterised by small size, self-governance, a very local attitude, and the 
principle of mutuality (internal: the activity is mainly biased in favour of associates; external: 
there important activities aimed at supporting the moral, cultural and economic development of 
the local community). 
The strengths of CB's are the deep understanding of local economies (which reduces the typical 
problems of asymmetric information existing in the credit market) and the network externalities 
associated with their mutual aid system (see Angelini et al., 1998). However, recently, 
deregulation and technological progress have increased the contestability of local credit markets, 
requiring CB's to improve their performance. As is also shown by Table 2, CB's face relatively 
low profit margins, high costs, and restricted income sources. 
It must be said that there exists for Italian CB's a so-called principle of prevalence, requiring that 
more than 50% of assets are either detained by members or in risk-free assets, according to the  
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criteria established by the Financial Regulator. Furthermore, as far as profit distribution is 
concerned, the Testo Unico Bancario, 1993, requires that CB's must: 
1. devote at least 70% of annual net profits to legal reserve; 
2. pay a share of annual net profits to mutual funds for the promotion and development of 
cooperation in an amount equal to 3%; 
3. devote to purposes of charity or mutual aid, the remaining share of profits.  
 
Table 2 - Selected Bank Performance Indicators (in %, 2002-04 average) 





Non-performing loans/total loans  6.6  5.5  6.5 
Bad debts/total loans  4.6  3.7  3.0 
Net interest income / total assets  2.2  2.5  3.2 
Gross income / total assets  3.5  3.8  4.1 
Share of non-interest income in total income  38.2  35.8  21.8 
Operating expenses / Gross income  59.4  59.4  67.8 
Loan losses / total assets  0.48  0.44  0.25 
Return on equity  7.9  7.6  6.7 
Solvency ratio  11.4  10.1  17.8 
Source: Fonteyne (2007) 
 
Because of these regulations, the possibility to compare CB's with other bans profit-efficiency 
wise must be seriously doubted. On the other hand, comparing their cost, and especially their 
technical, efficiency with that of other banks seems much more appropriate. Although generally 
the banking objective function is to maximize profits by choosing an optimal combination of 
inputs for maximum output, the same is not true for CB's (Fonteyne, 2007). However, also the 
latter are likely to aim for cost minimisation by choosing the mix of inputs corresponding to the 
lowest cost, because they need to meet a survival requirement (Pestieau and Tulkens, 1993).  
There is a further point, crucial for present purposes. CB's can provide loans only within a given  
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area, the so-called area of territorial competence, (area di competenza territoriale). The 
territorial competence (jurisdiction) of the CB's is determined by the Supervisory Instructions of 
the Bank of Italy and must be specified in their statute. It includes the municipalities in which the 
bank has its head office, branches and the surrounding areas, so that there must be territorial 
contiguity between these areas. Only in very special cases can CB's open branches in non-
contiguous municipalities. 
In Table 3 we highlight some consequences of this state of affairs. CB’s have less branches than 
other small banks (as defined by the Bank of Italy), and the mean distance between their head 
office and a given branch is smaller. 
Table 3 - Number of branches and head office-branches mean distance, various bank types, years 2006-2008. 
Percentiles  CB's 
Number of branches 
Other Small Banks 




Other Small Banks  
Head office-branches 
Mean distance 
5%  1  1  0  0 
25%  2  7  3.81  16.44 
50%  4  29  7.40  34.51 
75%  8  63  12.50  110.34 
95%  18  144  26.26  317.95 
Source: own calculations on BilBank 2000 data 
 
Sticking to the area of territorial competence greatly hampers any move to territorial 
diversification on the part of CB's and is likely to make them very sensitive to local shocks. In 
this paper we rely on this institutional difference between CB's and other banks in order to 
provide some measures of the cost of missing diversification. To do so, however, we must have 
some quantitative indicators of local shocks at an appropriate territorial level. 
A very important analytical category for territorial economic analyses in Italy is the Sistema 
locale del lavoro, SLL). This is a group of municipalities (akin to the UK's Travel-to-Work-
Areas) adjacent to each other geographically and statistically comparable, characterised by  
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common commuting flows of the working population. They are an analytical tool appropriate to 
the investigation of socio-economic structure at a fairly disaggregated territorial level. The 
identification of 686 SLL's made by ISTAT (the Italian Statistical Office) in some recent research 
(ISTAT, 2005) has highlighted remarkable differences in economic performance across the 
Italian territory. For purposes of comparison note that there are nowadays in Italy 110 province 
(the NUTS3-type classification) and 20 regioni (the NUTS2-type classification). 
Figure 3.1 depicts the economic performance of the SLL's in 2006. We believe that Fig. 3.1, 
relying on GDP per capita, very aptly describes the strong economic differences across Italy. 
Roughly speaking, the darker the area, the better the performance. 
Interestingly, not only the well-known North-South divide, but also some finer territorial 
differences, show up. This suggests that SLL-level indicators provide a much more accurate 
representation of the socio-economic environment than the usually adopted provincial (NUTS3) 
or regional (NUTS2) indicators. However, it could be rightfully asked what is the precise 
relevance of SLL-level statistical information for local banks. We immediately stress that there is 
no precise correspondence between a SLL and the area of territorial competence of a CB. 
However, especially for the smaller CB’s, there is a close correspondence between the SLL’s 
population and the bank customers’ pool (calculated as the sum of populations from 
municipalities where the bank has a branch). This correspondence is shown in Table 4, that also 
highlights how the population of the closest territorial divide (the provincia) is usually much 
larger than the CB customers’ pool. Also note that the customers’ pool of other small banks, 
unhampered by territorial regulations about loan provision, is even larger. 
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Source: GDP is constructed by updating the SLL data from ISTAT with the 2006 data from the Bureau Van Dijck’s 





Table 4 - Population and customers’ pools for various territorial divides and bank types, years 2006-2008 






Other Small Banks  
customers’pool 
5%  6,978  141,195  4,485  54,147 
25%  13,718  231,330  19,129  694,700 
50%  34,276  369,427  74,373  2,547,677 
75%  79,595  580,676  250,342  7,109,032 
95%  268,503  1,239,808  1,225,440  28,417,586 
Source: own calculations on ISTAT and BilBank 2000 data 
 
We conclude that SLL-level data are likely to provide useful information on the local shocks 
relevant for CB’s, potentially yielding novel evidence about the “bad luck” hypothesis and the 
importance of territorial diversification. 
 
4. The empirical set-up 
We believe the asset approach has maintained some ascendancy within the literature, especially 
when focusing on the role of banking efficiency for economic development (Lucchetti et al., 
2001; Hasan et al., 2009). We subsequently adopt it in the following empirical analysis, and 
define our output and input vectors accordingly. 
The vector of outputs is composed as follows: customer loans,  securities (loans to banks, 
Treasury bills and similar securities, bonds and other debt less bonds and debt securities held by 
banks and other financial institutions), other services (commission income and other operating 
income). The vector of inputs consists of the following items: number of branches, number of 
workers, and fundraising: total liabilities to customers, amounts owed to banks and debt 
securities (bonds, certificates of deposit and other securities). In order to measure cost efficiency, 
we also need a cost vector, which is composed as follows: (i) labour cost, the ratio between 
personnel costs (wages and salaries, social charges, pensions and the like) and the number of  
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employees, (ii) cost of physical capital, the ratio of other administrative expenses, value 
adjustments to tangible and intangible assets and other operating expenses to the number of 
branches and (iii) cost of financial capital, the ratio of interest expense and similar charges and 
commission expenses on total debt.  
Let us now turn to the more specific part of our analysis. Traditionally enough, we model 
differences in risk-preferences through an index of capitalisation (equity, equal to capital plus 
reserves – without adding profits or losses -, over total assets). As an indicator of socio-economic 
differences we take the SLL-level GDP per capita. As previously argued, this indicator is likely 
to capture hitherto neglected heterogeneity. Yet it can be reasonably supposed to be exogenous 
for small banks, allowing an appropriate test of the “bad luck” hypothesis. For each bank, we 
include in the production set the GDP per capita of the SLL where the bank’s head office is 
located. As also been said above, the impact of diversification is chiefly assessed by comparing 
the performance of cooperative and traditional small banks across Italian regions. The impact of 
SLL-level shocks, the “bad luck effect”, is expected to be stronger for CB’s, because they have 
less scope for territorial diversification out of this area. We can also readily provide a robustness 
check for this expected nexus: we include in the production set, along with the SLL-level GDP 
per capita, the mean distance between a bank’s head office and its branches (a measure akin to 
the diversification indicators constructed by Deng et al., 2007). Taking this structural indicator 
into account should reduce the differential “bad luck effect” across bank types, as a fundamental 
aspect of diversification should then be controlled for. 
Finally, in order to provide evidence about the impact of territorial diversification on the risk-
return profile, we also estimate a production set including a measure of asset quality, which is 
inversely related with credit risk. A popular indicator of asset quality is constructed as one minus  
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the ratio between bad and total loans (more precisely, as the ratio between "adjustments and 
recoveries of loans and provisions for guarantees and commitments" and total loans). The ratio 
between bad and total loans has been used in many works (Berger and De Young, 1997; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2011). We do not include non-performing loans in it because they represent a 
milder form of risk, possibly biasing the measurement of credit risk.
4 
Our key a priori expectation is that local GDP per capita affect CB's efficiency (and risk-return 
profile) much more than the other banks’ outcomes, due to CB’s stricter localisation rules. In 
principle local shocks ought to affect the relationship between bank inputs and outputs for given 
input prices, so that the differential “bad luck effect” should be stronger for technical than for 
allocative efficiency. Given this interest in decomposing efficiency in a multi-output production 
set, we estimate efficiency using the DEA (variable-returns to scale) nonparametric method 
(Farrell, 1957; Banker et al., 1984). DEA, like other non-parametric approaches, is very sensitive 
to the presence of outliers, which may bias estimates. To circumvent these problems, we applied 
the bootstrapping method suggested in Hall and Simar (2002). Also, we searched and eliminated 
all the outliers in the dataset using the super-efficiency and rho - Tørgensen's concepts 
(Tørgensen et al, 1996). 
Efficiency scores are measured in three different models, summarised in Table 5: a baseline 
asset-approach model (also including capitalisation), the baseline model plus GDP per capita, 
and the baseline model plus GDP per capita and the distance measure. Evidence about the risk-
return profile is obtained going through these three models again with the asset quality indicator 
in the production set. Capitalisation and asset quality (one minus the ratio between bad and total 
loans) are included in the production set as outputs, because they can be both thought as good 
outcomes whose realisation uses up bank resources. On the other hand GDP per capita is 
                                                 
4   See Fiordelisi et al. (2011) for further details on credit risk indicators.  
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included in the production set as a fixed (non-discretionary) input, and distance, being to some 
extent a choice variable and a feature of the bank branches, is modelled as an ordinary input. In 
estimating our DEA models, we relied on two packages based on the freeware R (FEAR 1.13, 
Benchmarking 0.18). 
Given our interest in CB's and local shocks, and the eminently comparative nature of frontier 
analysis, our sample relates to essentially local banks. It is made up by Italian banks classified by 
the Bank of Italy as a small (funds below 9 billion euro). We use data compiled from the 
database "BilBank 2000 - Analysis of bank balance sheets" distributed by ABI (the Italian 
Banking Association) for the 2006-2008 period. 
 
Table 5 - The Empirical Models: The Production Set  
Models  # 1  # 2  # 3 
INPUTS  Physical Capital 
Labour 
Funds 
“# 1” + 
SLL- level GDP per capita, 
(non-discretionary input) 
“# 1” + 
SLL- level GDP per capita, 








“# 1”   “# 1” 
NB: When assessing the risk-return profile, asset quality is included in all the three models as an output. 
 
This sample includes all CB's and most of the former savings and popular (popolari) banks. 
Table 6 (in the Appendix) provides some background information about the sample by 
geographical location and bank type. The balance-sheet information in this database allows 
calculation of measures for our inputs and outputs, as well as for asset quality and capitalisation. 
The GDP per capita of the head-office’s SLL is constructed by updating the SLL value added 
data from ISTAT through the 2006-2008 data from the Bureau Van Dijck’s AIDA dataset.  
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Population is from the ISTAT SLL data-set. The mean distance between a bank head office and a 
given branch is taken from the Bank of Italy’s database of branches. It is the availability for this 
variable that fundamentally drives our sample choice. Descriptive statistics about all these 
variables are provided in Tables 7 and 8 (also in the Appendix). 
 
5. The empirical evidence 
We applied DEA to the three versions of the asset approach, without and with the asset quality 
indicator, year by year, considering two different groupings of banks. The first grouping is 
simply given by all the banks in our sample, and it will be referred to as One Sample. Then, 
because of the important regulatory differences between CB's and other banks, it could be 
thought that a sharp distinction should be drawn between these two bank types. Estimates are 
then carried out for the two subsets separately, and we refer to these estimates as to those 
belonging to Two Samples. Our main a priori expectation is that CB's are much more affected by 
the “bad luck effect” than the other banks, due to their strict localisation rules. This impact 
should also be stronger when considering technical efficiency, as local shocks ought to affect the 
relationship between bank inputs and outputs for given input prices. The estimates reported in 
Table 9 (in the Appendix) support this expectation to a large extent. In order to make results 
more understandable, we only report mean efficiency scores from Italy's four territorial partitions 
(North-West, North-East, Centre, South). When comparing efficiency scores from Models #1, #2 
and #3, it clearly appears that local shocks, such as proxied by SLL-level GDP per capita, affect 
technical efficiency differentials, especially for CB’s. No great difference exists on the other 
hand between Models #2 and #3. If we control for the mean distance between a bank head office 
and a given branch, the “bad luck effect” greatly diminishes.  
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All in all, the “bad luck effect” comes out most clearly comparing Models #1 and #2, and 
considering banks located in the South, for One Sample. This can be easily rationalised. If we 
consider Two Samples, banks are not differentiated by their capability to absorb local shocks 
through territorial diversification. Hence, the impact of local shocks ought to be relatively 
weaker than in One Sample. In the latter, the technical efficiency of CB’s gains between 2 and 7 
percentage points in Model # 3, providing a quantitative measure of the costs of missing 
diversification. No large gain of this kind appears to exist for the other banks. Also, no clear 
pattern emerges across Models #1, #2 and #3 for allocative efficiency. The pattern of cost 
efficiency across models is decisively driven by technical efficiency, as was also expected. Note 
finally that the inclusion of the asset quality proxy makes no sizable difference to the estimates. 
Provided we believe that risk is adequately measured by our proxy, the above illustrated 
evidence then implies that territorial diversification has a significant impact on the risk-return 
profile of Italian small banks. 
In Table 10 of the Appendix, we give to our analysis a more formal twist. We consider the 
efficiency scores year by year, and apply to them the test for the equality of means suggested in 
Kittelsen (1999). Should this test be significant (we give in Table 10 its p-values), the differences 
between respectively Models #1 and #2, and Models #2 and #3, would be statistically significant. 
The results from Table 10 are overwhelmingly aligned with the previous considerations. In One 
Sample, the technical and cost efficiency scores are significantly higher in Model # 2 than in 
Model #1 for the CB’s only. The difference between CB’s and Other Banks partially fades away 
in Two Samples, but the significance tests always show lower p-values for the CB’s. Once again 
no strongly consistent pattern shows up for allocative efficiency. This also explains why Models 
#2 and #3 are almost never significantly different. All in all, there is rather convincing evidence  
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that a larger territorial spread among a bank’s branches reduces significantly the impact of local 
GDP per capita on cost efficiency. 
As we will discuss below, this evidence can be refined in various ways. However, we believe that 
these results show that modelling "environmental" variables at the SLL-level reduces to a great 
deal differences in technical and cost efficiency among Northern and Southern Italian banks. 
Analytically, this could point to a potentially strong endogeneity of previously available bank 
performance indicators. From a more practical standpoint, there appears to be some reasons to 
ease the localisation constraints for CB's. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have analysed the cost efficiency differentials among Italian small banks located 
in different geographical locations and belonging to two great institutional categories: CB’s and 
other banks. We have applied DEA throughout the 2006-2008 period, highlighting the effect of 
some environmental and institutional factors on banks' performance. The evidence shows that 
that local shocks, proxied by SLL-level GDP per capita, affect technical efficiency differentials, 
especially for CB’s. This can be easily rationalised, as current regulations hamper CB’s vis-à-vis 
other banks in their capability to diversify territorially. Our estimates provide us with a tentative 
quantitative measure of the costs of missing diversification, ranging between 2 and 7 percentage 
points. On the other hand our evidence suggests that there is potentially strong endogeneity in 
some currently available bank performance indicators. 
We are fully aware that there are various ways in which our evidence could be made much more 
robust. Perhaps most prominently, the return-risk profile of banks should be evaluated in the light 
of more sophisticated proxies than our simple measure relying on the ratio between bad and total  
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loans In future work we plan to include our measure of local shocks in a panel analysis of bank 
efficiency, risk, and capitalisation, also allowing for lagged relationships, as in Fiordelisi et al. 
(2011) or in Rossi et al. (2009). In order to do so, our sample should be extended through time. 
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Table 6 - Sample by bank types and areas 
 
 Year  2006  2007  2007 
CB's 
 
429  437  422 
Other Banks 
 
179  204  216 
ALL 
 
608  641  638 
       
  Geogr. location       
North – West 
CB's 
82  83  80 
 North – East 
CB's 
158  160  158 
Centre 
CB's 
90  91  86 
South 
CB's 
99  103  98 
 
 
     
North – West 
Other Banks 
43  45  48 
North – East 
Other Banks 
61  68  71 
Centre 
Other Banks 
47  57  62 
South 
Other Banks 
28  34  35 
Source: own calculations on BilBank 2000 data 
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Table 7 - Production and Costs: Some Descriptive Statistics, years 2006-2008. 
 
ALL 










 Cap. Cost 
Labour 
Cost 
Mean  660,202  291279  18789  831699  196  23  0.029842  900.589  68.60 
st. dev.  1198322  737977  49892  1460213  334  42  0.017417  6,070.122  16.14 
Min  22  2810  5  1594  3  1  0.004378  8  9.73 
Max  8808730  8767580  608546  9157992  2471  727  0.313573  176910  213.75 
             
 
   
CB's 
(mean values)             
 
   
North-West  183,537.5  73459.22  3336.985  220969.2  74  10  0.0366172  364.5561  56.3551 
North-East  134,558.3  60986.43  2095.631  166734  51  7  0.037272  390.7106  57.24301 
Centre  116,429.3  72112.01  2234.488  170309.1  56  6  0.0358567  451.15  55.29879 
South  38,795.43  43718.11  824.2861  73897.55  25  4  0.0351298  367.4843  56.56504 
Total  117,433  61370.09  2055.504  155504.3  50  7  0.0363564  391.6745  56.53395 
             
 
   
Other Banks 
(mean values)             
 
   
North-West  1070078  476200.2  33274.49  7,488,347  499  47  0.036865  1223.601  57.38187 
North-East  1025914  835781.4  61077.01  9,964,507  515  43  0.0471912  6279.818  65.91323 
Centre  929979.1  577952  40867.89  8,891,967  488  46  0.0391703  2742.779  59.28032 
South  684018.9  479397  19783.29  2,571,438  432  40  0.0382668  862.296  52.88012 
Total  946197.7  615112.1  41383.01  7,885,528  488  44  0.0409286  3125.571  59.68412 




Table 8 - Environmental factors, mean values by area and bank type, years 2006-2008 
 
  Equity/ Asset 
Ratio 
Asset Quality  GDP per capita  Head office-
branches 
Mean distance 








North-West  0.1307 0.1445 0.9742 0.9752  25.15  26.73  14.53  63.74 
North-East  0.1510 0.1443 0.9639 0.9785  25.04  30.84  7.92  99.92 
Centre  0.1252 0.1383 0.9526 0.9593  21.32  19.99  9.13  66.87 
South  0.1396 0.1458 0.9241 0.9441  15.49  17.39  17.01  75.16 
Total  0.1394 0.1430 0.9541 0.9661  22.08  24.76  11.55  78.539 
Source: own calculations on BilBank 2000 data 
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Table 9 - The Mean Efficiency Scores 
 
CB's, One sample, model without Asset Quality Indicator, 2006-2008 Averages 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
North-West  0,7196 0,8565 0,6158 0,7339 0,8588 0,6298 0,7517 0,8406 0,6317
North-East  0,7649 0,8897 0,6800 0,7824 0,8917 0,6973 0,8037 0,8695 0,6986
Centre  0,6694 0,8739 0,5844 0,6993 0,8682 0,6068 0,7115 0,8547 0,6080
South  0,6452 0,8155 0,5263 0,7268 0,8164 0,5933 0,7342 0,8078 0,5931
 
CB's, One sample, model with Asset Quality Indicator, 2006-2008 Averages 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
North-West  0,7336 0,8497 0,6229 0,7477 0,8521 0,6367 0,7637 0,8358 0,6382
North-East  0,7790 0,8870 0,6906 0,7957 0,8909 0,7086 0,8178 0,8683 0,7101
Centre  0,6710 0,8731 0,5853 0,7016 0,8683 0,6088 0,7141 0,8545 0,6101
South  0,6452 0,8160 0,5266 0,7310 0,8198 0,5992 0,7390 0,8106 0,5991
 
Other banks, One sample, model without Asset Quality Indicator, 2006-2008 Averages 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
North-West  0,8108 0,8242 0,6688 0,8171 0,8252 0,6749 0,8427 0,8018 0,6762
North-East  0,8611 0,8192 0,7057 0,8694 0,8248 0,7174 0,8809 0,8138 0,7173
Centre  0,7645 0,7695 0,5885 0,7919 0,7674 0,6084 0,8065 0,7531 0,6081
South  0,7605 0,7585 0,5767 0,8081 0,7569 0,6117 0,8140 0,7519 0,6122
 
Other Banks, One sample, model with Asset Quality Indicator, 2006-2008 Averages 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
North-West  0,8176 0,8224 0,6729 0,8242 0,8251 0,6805 0,8509 0,8006 0,6818
North-East  0,8864 0,8407 0,7458 0,8929 0,8466 0,7565 0,9037 0,8367 0,7566
Centre  0,7794 0,7680 0,5992 0,8054 0,7695 0,6204 0,8193 0,7564 0,6206
South  0,7687 0,7558 0,5809 0,8140 0,7586 0,6176 0,8196 0,7538 0,6180
 




CB's, Two samples, model without Asset Quality Indicator, 2006-2008 Averages 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
North-West  0,8235 0,9450 0,7782 0,8266 0,9462 0,7822 0,8339 0,9378 0,7821
North-East  0,8480 0,9482 0,8041 0,8548 0,9518 0,8136 0,8702 0,9356 0,8142
Centre  0,8135 0,9463 0,7698 0,8210 0,9482 0,7785 0,8263 0,9421 0,7784
South  0,8333 0,9084 0,7571 0,8701 0,9167 0,7977 0,8718 0,9134 0,7964
 
CB's, Two samples, model with Asset Quality Indicator, 2006-2008 Averages 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
North-West  0,8384 0,9452 0,7925 0,8418 0,9469 0,7971 0,8479 0,9398 0,7969
North-East  0,8612 0,9504 0,8185 0,8684 0,9545 0,8290 0,8820 0,9404 0,8294
Centre  0,8168 0,9483 0,7746 0,8255 0,9506 0,7847 0,8307 0,9446 0,7847
South  0,8346 0,9118 0,7612 0,8743 0,9218 0,8060 0,8765 0,9181 0,8047
 
Other banks, Two samples, model without Asset Quality Indicator, 2006-2008 Averages 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
North-West  0,8443 0,7950 0,6713 0,8536 0,7945 0,6784 0,8815 0,7711 0,6800
North-East  0,8813 0,8023 0,7071 0,8899 0,8081 0,7193 0,9013 0,7982 0,7197
Centre  0,8078 0,7309 0,5902 0,8373 0,7391 0,6191 0,8506 0,7274 0,6190
South  0,7888 0,7388 0,5826 0,8426 0,7595 0,6398 0,8468 0,7557 0,6399
 
Other Banks, Two samples, model with Asset Quality Indicator, 2006-2008 Averages 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
North-West  0,8494 0,7979 0,6777 0,8643 0,8031 0,6945 0,8881 0,7899 0,6933
North-East  0,9050 0,8266 0,7485 0,9147 0,8406 0,7697 0,9194 0,8317 0,7651
Centre  0,8197 0,7333 0,6013 0,8494 0,7547 0,6415 0,8534 0,7428 0,6340
South  0,7941 0,7398 0,5873 0,8470 0,7710 0,6531 0,8498 0,7619 0,6474
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Table 10 - The Mean Efficiency Scores, Annual Values and Some Tests 
 
CB's, One sample, model without Asset Quality Indicator 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.7249 0.8140 0.5931  0.7535 0.8226 0.6227  0.7626 0.8145 0.6233
2007  0.6918 0.8878 0.6161  0.7229 0.8914 0.6469  0.7456 0.8664 0.6482
2008  0.7092 0.8866 0.6274  0.7526 0.8750 0.6591  0.7673 0.8588 0.6592
        Model # 2 vs Model # 1  Model # 3 vs Model # 2
  Tech. Alloc. Cost  Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.0006 0.0936 0.0011  0.1535 0.1072 0.4766
2007  0.0003 0.2444 0.0006  0.0064 0.0000 0.4468
2008  0.0000 0.0083 0.0001  0.0426 0.0008 0.4954
 
CB's, One sample, model with Asset Quality Indicator 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.7295 0.8117 0.5950 0.7602 0.8226 0.6283 0.7704 0.8134 0.6289
2007  0.7005 0.8865 0.6230 0.7329 0.8905 0.6554 0.7548 0.8666 0.6565
2008  0.7206 0.8831 0.6351 0.7629 0.8737 0.6673 0.7777 0.8575 0.6673
        Model # 2 vs Model # 1  Model # 3 vs Model # 2
  Tech. Alloc. Cost  Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.0004 0.0496 0.0004 0.1330 0.0832 0.4788
2007  0.0004 0.2169 0.0006 0.0104 0.0000 0.4541
2008  0.0000 0.0246 0.0001 0.0460 0.0009 0.4968
 
Other Bank, One sample, model without Asset Quality Indicator 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.7956 0.7380 0.5959 0.8100 0.7423 0.6099 0.8245 0.7298 0.6103
2007  0.7962 0.8371 0.6700 0.8177 0.8338 0.6864 0.8370 0.8150 0.6872
2008  0.8282 0.8154 0.6782 0.8509 0.8183 0.7006 0.8612 0.8083 0.7007
        Model # 2 vs Model # 1  Model # 3 vs Model # 2
  Tech. Alloc. Cost  Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.1580 0.3798 0.2404 0.1525 0.1924 0.4922
2007  0.0648 0.3794 0.1687 0.0778 0.0472 0.4828
2008  0.0340 0.3961 0.0782 0.1944 0.1887 0.4959
 
Other Banks, One sample, model with Asset Quality Indicator 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.8043 0.7449 0.6095 0.8207 0.7511 0.6269 0.8350 0.7390 0.6273
2007  0.8134 0.8405 0.6885 0.8316 0.8413 0.7056 0.8515 0.8225 0.7063
2008  0.8487 0.8229 0.7022 0.8686 0.8262 0.7226 0.8780 0.8172 0.7224
        Model # 2 vs Model # 1  Model # 3 vs Model # 2
  Tech. Alloc. Cost  Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.1233 0.3391 0.2040 0.1525 0.2155 0.4922
2007  0.0993 0.4713 0.1698 0.0698 0.0538 0.4847
2008  0.0499 0.3936 0.1131 0.2047 0.2327 0.4972
           ( c o n t i n u e )   
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CB's, Two samples, model without Asset Quality Indicator 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.8259 0.9263 0.7657 0.8421 0.9316 0.7849 0.8494 0.9232 0.7843
2007  0.8293 0.9464 0.7852 0.8401 0.9477 0.7967 0.8495 0.9372 0.7962
2008  0.8430 0.9411 0.7937 0.8557 0.9462 0.8102 0.8647 0.9363 0.8097
        Model # 2 vs Model # 1  Model # 3 vs Model # 2
  Tech. Alloc. Cost  Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.0186 0.1265 0.0121 0.1706 0.0356 0.4726
2007  0.0779 0.3403 0.0750 0.1120 0.0009 0.4752
2008  0.0457 0.0652 0.0194 0.1159 0.0023 0.4784
 
CB's, Two samples, model with Asset Quality Indicator 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.8318 0.9284 0.7732 0.8497 0.9353 0.7954 0.8564 0.9275 0.7948
2007  0.8386 0.9469 0.7947 0.8507 0.9488 0.8079 0.8589 0.9395 0.8074
2008  0.8540 0.9446 0.8075 0.8671 0.9499 0.8245 0.8754 0.9409 0.8241
        Model # 2 vs Model # 1  Model # 3 vs Model # 2
  Tech. Alloc. Cost  Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.0122 0.0728 0.0062 0.1975 0.0509 0.4739
2007  0.0602 0.2801 0.0550 0.1436 0.0033 0.4761
2008  0.0417 0.0626 0.0192 0.1369 0.0055 0.4797
 
Other Banks, Two samples, model without Asset Quality Indicator 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.8371 0.7044 0.6003 0.8555 0.7208 0.6279 0.8680 0.7112 0.6282
2007  0.8220 0.8124 0.6743 0.8503 0.8072 0.6940 0.8708 0.7894 0.6951
2008  0.8537 0.7953 0.6841 0.8725 0.8061 0.7091 0.8831 0.7961 0.7089
        Model # 2 vs Model # 1  Model # 3 vs Model # 2
  Tech. Alloc. Cost  Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.0575 0.1424 0.0896 0.1374 0.2741 0.4936
2007  0.0095 0.3196 0.1250 0.0327 0.0614 0.4768
2008  0.0385 0.1637 0.0559 0.1513 0.1904 0.4948
 
Other Banks, Two samples, model with Asset Quality Indicator 
  Model # 1    Model # 2    Model # 3 
  Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost    Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.8431 0.7168 0.6166 0.8635 0.7348 0.6473 0.8756 0.7255 0.6477
2007  0.8362 0.8195 0.6931 0.8596 0.8206 0.7144 0.8680 0.8253 0.7257
2008  0.8733 0.8046 0.7089 0.8994 0.8359 0.7583 0.8979 0.8078 0.7320
        Model # 2 vs Model # 1  Model # 3 vs Model # 2
  Tech. Alloc. Cost  Tech. Alloc. Cost 
2006  0.0413 0.1382 0.0813 0.1431 0.2936 0.4926
2007  0.0262 0.4643 0.1191 0.2293 0.3469 0.2698
2008  0.0040 0.0044 0.0014 0.4352 0.0105 0.0565
 